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PREFACE 
The name of William Whewell is certainly 
more familiar to most philosophers nowadays than it was a few 
years ago. No longer merely regarded as an opponent of Mill, 
Whewell, over a period of recent years, 1 has emerged as a 
philosopher of merit in his own right. Indeed this latest 
judgement has now proceeded to the point where an influential 
modern thinker can claim in a major work that "throughout this 
book the view is being maintained that theory can fruitfully 
be looked upon as the imaginative construction of models accord-
ing to well-chosen principles, and that, in many ways, the 
theory of "Ideas" in Whewell's sense, is more helpful in the 
theory of theories and scientific method generally, than the 
2 logic of statements". 
The favour with which aspects of Whewell's 
thought are being greeted in some quarters, as an aid in the 
construction of an alternative philosophy of science to that 
represented by the tradition of Mill, is a noteworthy phenomenon. 
Its explanation, however, would be a large task involving no 
less than a critical summation of the whole of Nineteenth and 
Twentieth Century British philosophy up until the present. Such 
a task is obviously beyond the scope of this thesis. Yet if 
any such summation were to be undertaken in the future, the 
problem of the historical status of Whewell's philosophy within 
1. The contemporary literature on Whewell begins with the appear-
ance of two articles by C.J. Ducasse in Phil Rev, 60 (1951), 
reprinted in Blake, Ducasse, and Madden (ed).:Theories of 
Scientific Method. 
2. Harre,R.: The Principles of Scientific Thinking, p42. 
(iii) 
its own Century would be an issue of importance. This thesis, 
therefore, is an attempt to place Whewell's thought within the 
context of Nineteenth Century philosophical problems and 
issues, particularly as they are related to matters of science. 
Consequently, it is more inclined to be a history, though 
a critical one, than an attempt at direct philosophising. Such 
a history is required, apart from the intrinsic interest of 
the topic itself, by any attempt to take the overview of Nine-
teenth and Twentieth Century British philosophy that has been 
suggested. This is particularly the case in connection with 
the problems which Whewell 1 s philosophy, as a species of Kant's, 
could not solve in its own day, and which continue to trouble 
philosophers who look back favourably in the direction of Kant. 
As a history, the thesis opens in Chapter I 
with a sketch of Whewell's life, followed by a general state-
ment of the motives and intentions of Whewell's philosophical 
stance. Chapters II and III treat in turn the two pillars of 
Whewell's thinking, necessary truth and induction, and trace 
his attempts to reconcile his particular viewpoints on each. 
The problems associated with this reconciliation are brought 
out most fully in Chapter IV, and the Final Chapter deals with 
the fate of Whewell's philosophy, conditioned as it was by 
the problems which it faced, during the later Nineteenth Century. 
